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1 Introduction
Oil prices have a boom-bust cycle that may stretch between 10 to 15 years, but their short-run e¤ects
can also be global.1 Housing prices in di¤erent countries share a similar cycle pattern. For example, in
countries like Spain, the United Kingdom or the United States, the housing market dynamics display the
typical boom-bust cycle that follows a prolonged normal time period (Young, 2013; Agnello et al., 2015).
Even the Great Recession emerged near the end of a large oil shock, which led to a downturn in housing prices
and triggered the nancial crisis of 2008-2009 (Hamilton, 2009).2 Thus, there is a potential link between the
oil price and housing price cycles (Hamilton, 2011).
The existing literature embraces di¤erent channels through which commodity prices and housing prices
may be associated. First, energy price increases have both direct and indirect impacts on disposable income
and household spending (i.e., the income and demand e¤ects), as they raise unemployment rates, shrink the
purchasing power and squeeze prots in oil importing countries at the benet of oil exporters.3 This has a
detrimental e¤ect on housing demand (Spencer et al., 2012). Kaufmann et al. (2011) also nd a reasonable
correlation between household energy expenditure and US mortgage delinquency rates.
Second, energy price surges have both direct and indirect e¤ects on construction costs, whether in terms
of producing and operating equipment and consuming raw materials, and hence a¤ect the quantities and
the prices of houses. Moreover, Quigley (1984) shows that increases in energy price can lead to a reasonable
rise in the housing service costs. Similarly, as the housing sector represents a large fraction of overall energy
consumption in OECD countries, rising energy costs can have a large impact on housing prices (Swan and
Ugursal, 2009).
Third, energy price increases can a¤ect the headline ination rate and induce a tightening in monetary
policy, which erodes liquidity and can in turn reduce housing demand (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009).
Fourth, since the nancialisation of commodities is important, a sharp rise in energy prices can increase
the attractiveness of commodities and generate large portfolio rebalancing e¤ects away from stocks and
houses and towards commodities through capital ows (Caballero et al., 2008; El-Gamal and Ja¤e, 2010;
Basu and Gavin, 2010).
Fifth, common factors (such as changes in the regulation and supervision of nancial markets, global eco-
nomic growth and variations in global liquidity) can inuence the joint dynamics of commodity and housing
prices where periods of expansion in global liquidity have typically coincided with substantial increases in
commodity prices (Hammoudeh and Yuan, 2008; Batten et al., 2010; Belke et al., 2010; Ratti and Vespignani,
2013, 2015; Belke et al., 2014; Frankel, 2014).
1 Innovations, commercial interests, geopolitics, and military conicts have generally been the drivers of the boom-bust cycle
of the oil industry (El-Ramly, 2015; Groneworld, 2015).
2Fluctuations in commodity prices may be predictors of future industrial production (Sadorsky, 1999; Park and Ratti, 2009;
Narayan and Sharma, 2011) and other real economic activity (Hamilton, 1996, 2003, 2011). Earlier studies show that housing
price downturns and oil price spikes tend to go hand in hand with the likelihood of economic recessions (Hamilton, 2003, 2005).
Leamer (2007) argues that, despite representing a relatively small component of GDP, the housing sector plays a major role
during recessions, contributing to their persistence and severity. Hamilton (2011) also argues that the relationship between
housing price corrections and energy price volatility strengthened during the Great Recession.
3Leung et al. (2013) highlight that in an open economy commodity prices can a¤ect the price of non-tradable goods (such as
housing). Following Chen and Rogo¤ (2003), the authors highlight that commodity price uctuations can be seen as "exogenous
shocks", especially in countries where primary commodities represent a large fraction of total exports and thus have a major
impact on the terms of trade. This is considered in the literature as a form of resource curse. Therefore, housing prices in some
cities of those countries can be interpreted as "commodity house prices.
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Sixth, depreciating domestic currencies attract foreign buyers of domestic properties and can contribute
to housing booms and busts.
Seventh, in the specic case of emerging market economies, Chiquier and Lea (2009) highlight the im-
portance of the expansion of housing nance and underline its major drivers, including (i) lower ination
and mortgage interest rates; (ii) stronger housing demand related to demographic factors and urbaniza-
tion; and (iii) nancial liberalization. Additionally, the global commodity price boom of 2000-2008 and the
rapid growth had induced large capital inows (Higgins et al., 2006).4 This can lead to exceptionally large
uctuations in asset prices, including house prices.
In our paper, we investigate the potential spillovers from a series of oil-related variables to the duration of
various phases of the housing market cycle for net oil-exporting and -importing countries. More specically,
we use quarterly data for a group of 20 industrialized countries and conduct a preliminary detection of
upturns and downturns in real housing prices to identify periods of booms, busts and normal times in the
housing market while taking into account their magnitude, persistence and severity. Then, we rely on both
continuous-time and discrete-time Weibull models to assess the impact of the oil sector dynamics on the
housing cycle.
Our results show that the duration of housing booms of both net oil importers and exporters falls when
oil prices increase. Moreover, net oil importers seem to be less vulnerable to protracted housing busts than
net oil exporters.5 Additionally, increases in the price of oil during normal times in the housing market cycle
can well be described as an improvement in economic conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modeling approaches and
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyzes the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling Approaches
2.1 The continuous-time duration model
The duration variable is dened as the number of periods quarters in this study over which a housing
market boom, bust or normal cycle takes place. If T is dened as the discrete random variable that measures
the time span between the beginning of one of those events and the moment it ends, the series of data at
our disposal (t1; t2; : : : ; tn) will represent the duration of those events. The probability distribution of the
duration variable T can be specied by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (t) = Pr(T < t).
This function measures the probability of the random variable T being smaller than a certain value t. A
particularly useful function for the duration analysis is the hazard function
h(t) = f(t)=S(t); (1)
4Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) show that, compared to advanced countries, housing prices have larger growth rates, higher
volatility, and lower degree of synchronization and persistence in emerging market economies. Their correlation with capital
ows is also stronger and they are more sensitive to global liquidity shocks. In addition, house prices are strongly procyclical
in emerging markets (Igan and Loungani, 2012). Ciarlone (2012) nd that house prices in emerging economies are not largely
disconnected from fundamentals, but the adjustment to the latter is slow and overly optimistic expectations were more prominent
before the onset of the global nancial crisis.
5 In this context, our work is highly indebted to Breitenfellner et al. (2015), who nd that a rise in energy ination strongly
increases the probability of a correction in housing prices. Therefore, the pass-through of oil prices to nancial markets is
important, and energy price ination can be thought as a macro-nancial risk indicator.
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where f(t) is the respective density function, while S(t) = Pr(T  t) = 1   F (t) is the survival function
which measures the probability of an event surviving for t or more time. The hazard function reects the
rate at which housing booms, busts or normal times will end at t, given that they lasted until that moment.
In other words, this function captures the probability of exiting from a state in moment t conditional on
the length of time in that state. From the hazard function, we can derive the integrated hazard function,
H(t) =
R t
0
h(u)du, and the corresponding survival function, S(t) = exp[ H(t)].
The hazard function allows for a characterization of the dependence duration path. If dh(t)=dt > 0, there
is a positive duration dependence, that is, the probability of a housing boom, bust or normal time ending at
t, given that it has reached t, increases with its age. Thus, the longer the respective event is, the higher the
conditional probability of it ending will be.
We use a proportional hazards model to parameterize the hazard function:6
h(t;x) = h0(t) exp(
0x); (2)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the duration dependence of the data,  is a (K1)
vector of parameters to be estimated and x is a vector of covariates that do not vary over the duration
of the event. This model is suitable for the analysis of the duration of the various phases of the housing
market cycle, as we can impose a specic parametric form to the function h0(t) to estimate the magnitude
of the duration dependence. In fact, the Weibull distribution ts perfectly this goal. Hence, the respective
(baseline) hazard function is given by:
h0(t) = pt
p 1; (3)
with  > 0 and p > 0. In this hazard function,  is a constant and p parameterizes the duration dependence.
This means that if p > 1, the conditional probability of a turning point occurring will increase as the phase
gets older, i.e. there will be positive duration dependence. However, a negative duration dependence is
observed when p < 1, but if p = 1, there will be no duration dependence. Therefore, as intended, by
estimating p, we can test for duration dependence in housing booms, busts and normal times.
Including the Weibull specication for the baseline hazard function in the proportional hazard function
given above by equation (2), we have:
h(t;x) = ptp 1 exp(0x): (4)
Hence, the corresponding survival function can be written as follows:
S(t;x) = exp [ H(t;x)] = exp  tp exp(0x) : (5)
This model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The likelihood function for a sample of i = 1; : : : ; n
spells is given by
L() =
nY
i=1
f(ti;xi) =
nY
i=1
h(ti;xi)
ciS(ti;xi); (6)
6This means that the ratio of the hazard rates for any pair of observations is constant over time.
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where ci indicates when observations are censored. If the sample period under analysis ends before the turning
point has been observed, the observations will be censored (ci = 0); if the turning points are observed in the
sample period, the observations will not censored (ci = 1).
Following Allison (1982), the corresponding log-likelihood function with the respective Weibull hazard
and survival functions can be written as follows:
lnL() =
nX
i=1

ci
 
ln  + ln p+ (p  1) ln ti + 0xi
  tpi exp(0xi) : (7)
Although the life of a housing boom, a bust or a normal time is a continuous-time process, the available
data is inherently discrete, which leads us to consider, in addition, a discrete-time duration analysis.
2.2 The discrete-time duration model
When the discrete units are very small, one can treat time as if it is continuous (Allison, 1982). However,
when the time units are very large, a discrete-time duration analysis may be more adequate. This can be
particularly relevant in the case of housing market cycles, where the available data is grouped into large
(quarterly) discrete-time intervals. Therefore, we rely not only on continuous-time Weibull models to analyse
the presence of duration dependence in the housing market cycle - as Agnello et al. (2015) do -, but also on
discrete-time Weibull models, which have the advantage of easing the inclusion of time-varying covariates
(see Agnello et al. (forthcoming)).7
To implement discrete-time methods, we start with a continuous-time model (namely, the proportional
hazards model) and, then, derive the appropriate estimator for the data grouped into intervals. A discrete-
time (grouped data) version of the proportional hazards model was developed by Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978) and Allison (1982), from where we can dene the discrete-time hazard rate as follows:
Pit = Pr[Ti = tjTi > t;xit]; (8)
where Ti is the discrete random variable representing the uncensored time at which the event (boom, bust
or normal time) ends and xit is a vector of time-varying explanatory variables. It is also assumed that time
can only take integer values (i.e. t = 1; 2; 3; : : :) and that we observe n independent spells (i.e. housing
booms, busts or normal times; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) starting at t = 1. The observation continues until time ti, at
which either an event occurs or the observation is censored, i.e. the event is observed at ti, but not at ti+1.
Therefore, Pit measures the conditional probability of event i ending at time t, given that it has not ended
yet.
Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), the corresponding discrete-time proportional hazard function
can be written as:
Pit = 1  exp
 ht exp(0xit) = 1  exp   exp(t + 0xit) : (9)
7Compared to the work of Agnello and Schuknecht (2011), who focus on the particular features of each phase of the housing
market cycle, our framework also takes into account the relevance of own age (history) in explaining them. Thus, it helps to
explain the transition across the various phases of the housing cycle and its likely driving forces.
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This function is equivalent to the complementary log-log (or cloglog) function:
ln [  ln(1  Pit)] = t + 0xit; (10)
where t (= lnht) denotes the logarithm of an unspecied baseline hazard function of time, while  is the
vector of parameters associated to the time-varying explanatory variables, xit, as in equation (2).
To proceed with the estimation, we need to choose a functional form for t. As is common in the
literature, we opt for a discrete-time model that is analogue to the Weibull model:
t = lnht = + (p  1) ln t: (11)
Alternatively, t can be specied as: (i) a polynomial-in-time (t = 0 + 1t + 2t2 + 3t3 + :::), where
we may have linear, quadratic, cubic or other polynomials for the hazard function; (ii) piecewise-dummies
(t = 0 + 1d1 + 2d2 + 3d3 + :::) - i.e., one dummy for each particular sub-period of time - where the
hazard rate is assumed to be the same within each time-group, but di¤erent between those groups; or (iii)
a fully non-parametric specication with one dummy for each value of t for which an event is reported
(time-dummies). Given their exibility, some of these alternatives will be evaluated in this study.
The discrete-time log-likelihood function for a sample of i = 1; :::; n spells is given by:
lnL() =
nX
i=1
tiX
j=1
yit ln

Pij
1  Pij

+
nX
i=1
tiX
j=1
ln (1  Pij) ; (12)
where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if the housing boom, bust or normal time i ends at time t, and
0 otherwise. After replacing equation (10) into (12) and using the adequate specication for the baseline
hazard function, the model can be estimated via a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE).
2.3 Variable selection
The selection of covariates xit 2 X entering the discrete-time version of the duration model is driven by
theoretical arguments and the existing empirical evidence presented in Section 1.
In order to investigate the potential spillovers from uctuations in the oil price to the duration of housing
booms, busts and normal times (i.e., the "oil price" transmission channel), we consider the following set of
oil-related indicators (Xoil): 1) net oil exports as a percentage of GDP (NetExp); 2) a dummy variable that
takes the value of one when the country is a net oil importer in 2012 (xed denition based on the last year
of the sample for which data are available), and zero otherwise (OilImpF ); 3) a dummy variable that takes
the value of one when the country is a net oil importer (contemporaneous denition), and zero otherwise
(OilImpC); 4) the oil price for each individual country (OilPr); and 5) the world oil price (WOilPr).
We remark that the distinction between net oil exporters and net oil importers is particularly useful in
the assessment of the macroeconomic impact of oil prices on the housing cycle. For instance, if oil price falls,
net oil importers are expected to benet from real income gains as a result of an improvement in their terms
6
of trade. The opposite occurs in countries where the oil sector is large or even dominant and other activities
depend on oil revenues, including public and private spending (i.e. for net oil exporters).
Each variable of the vector Xoil is added (one at time) to the set of macroeconomic variables (Xmacro),
which are considered as the main drivers of the housing market cycle. In this context, studies by Agnello
and Schuknecht (2011) and Taylor (2007) show that interest rates are expected to have an impact on the
dynamics of housing prices (both directly or indirectly (via their e¤ect on money and credit availability)),
as they inuence the probability of housing price booms and busts. In line with this view, we have included
the lending rate (LendIR) among the set of explanatory variables. Following Agnello et al. (forthcoming),
we have also considered the role of the "credit channel" as represented by growth rate of domestic credit
to the private sector (Cred) and the "income channel" as dened by the growth rate of real GDP (GDP ).
Overall, we expect that better economic conditions and easier access to credit (due to lower interest rates
and/or wider credit availability) contribute to reduce (increase) the probability of housing booms (busts)
ending.
Finally, a dummy variable (European) is also included among the set of regressors to test the possible
existence of signicant di¤erences in the length of housing booms/busts in European countries vis-à-vis
non-European countries.
Summing up, it follows that the hazard function (8) can be conveniently re-written as:
Pit = Pr [Ti = tjTi > t; fXoil;Xmacrog] : (13)
3 Data
As indicated, our analysis covers a sample of 20 industrialized countries over the period 1970Q1-2012Q2.8
The quarterly data on the housing prices index (HP ) are provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD). The time series of the real GDP growth rate (GDP ), the lending
interest rate (LendIR) and the growth rate of domestic credit to the private sector (Cred) are obtained
from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The data for net oil
exports come from the IMF, the individual-country oil price data is gathered from the OECD, and the world
oil price is provided by the Dow Jones & Company. The data used in duration analysis are organized in
spells, which, in our study, represent the duration of a boom, a bust or a normal period, denoted by Dur.9
The episodes of booms and busts in housing markets are identied using a simple statistical approach
as in Agnello et al. (2015, forthcoming) and Burnside et al. (2016). Given the quarterly frequency of our
data, we start by smoothing the logarithm of real housing price series, Yt, to avoid capturing undesirable
high-frequency movements. Thus, we compute their centered-moving average, that is, Y t =
nP
j= n
Yt+j=2n.
Then, we dene an upturn as an interval of time during which Y t > 0 for all t, while we denote a
downturnas an interval of time in which Y t < 0. A peak or trough is the last period within an upturn
and a downturn, respectively. The price change in a run-up (downturn) is required to exceed (fall below) a
8The countries included in our sample are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
9Dur corresponds to ti in the model described in the previous Section.
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minimum (maximum) bound before it can be labelled as a boom (bust). It follows that a housing boom is
dened as an upturn such that Y T   Y T L > z and, analogously, a housing bust is a downturn for which
Y T   Y T L <  z, where T indicates the peak of the boom or the trough of the bust and L is the duration
of the upturn or the downturn. The identication of booms and busts is based on the assumption that n = 5
and z = 0:15. 10To the extent that housing booms and housing busts reect house price misalignments, then
we can interpret the normal times in housing markets as periods during which house prices are in line with
their equilibrium values.
4 Empirical Results
We begin the empirical analysis by presenting in Figure 1 the scatter diagrams of the (non-negative) duration
of boom, bust and normal periods in the housing market and the oil price for each individual country (OilPr).
As can be seen, they suggest that the length of housing booms is negatively associated with oil prices. In
contrast, the duration of housing busts seems to be negatively linked with the dynamics of oil prices. Finally,
for normal time spells, the relationship between duration and oil prices does not display a clear pattern.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Figure 2 plots the hazard rates and the survival functions for the duration of housing booms, busts
and normal times. The hazard rates show that, for all phases of the housing market cycle, the conditional
probability of the respective spell ending at time t, given that it has not ended yet, tends to increase over time.
Therefore, as time goes by and each phase becomes older, the likelihood that it will end rises. Consequently,
the survival functions steadily fall for housing booms, housing busts and normal times. However, this piece of
evidence does not allow us to assess whether such patterns are statistically signicant and, most importantly,
if they can be explained by oil price developments.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
To address these issues, a deeper statistical examination with parametric continuous-time and discrete-
time duration models is provided in Tables 1 to 9. While testing for duration dependence, we also assess
whether, as argued by Zellner (1990) and Sichel (1991) for the business cycles, the duration of the previ-
ous housing markets phase a¤ects the length of the current one. Hence, we include the dummy variable,
DurPrev, among the set of time-invariant regressors (of the continuous-time duration models). We also
control for the typology of the previous phase by adding the dummy variable Prev. This takes the value of
one if the preceding phase of a boom was a bust (i.e. a "bust-boom" cycle), and zero otherwise; analogougly,
it takes the value of one if the preceding phase of a bust was a boom (i.e. a "boom-bust" cycle), and zero
otherwise. Finally, during normal times, it takes the value of one if the preceding phase was a boom (i.e. a
"cyclical slowdown"), and zero if it was a bust (i.e. a "cyclical recovery").
10We note note that the empirical evidence is robust to small changes in these parameters.
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4.1 From the oil sector to housing booms?
Tables 1-3 present the results for housing booms. In Table 1, we report the ndings associated with the
continuous-time Weibull model. Only the duration dependence parameter (p) and a set of relevant time-
invariant variables are considered in this framework. The latter includes: i) a dummy variable Event, which
allows us to analyze whether the durations of booms, busts and normal times becomes gradually longer or
shorter over time. This variable reports the order or the observation number of each event over time and
for every single country. It is equal to 1 for the rst event, 2 for the second one, and so on. If the coe¢ cient
associated with this variable is signicantly smaller (larger) than zero, phase durations get longer (shorter)
over time; ii) the type of the previous phase (Prev) and the duration of the previous phase (DurPrev)
as discussed in the previous section 4; iii) a dummy for European countries (European), which takes the
value of one for European countries, and zero otherwise and allows us to test whether there is a signicant
di¤erence in the average duration of housing price phases between European and non-European countries;
iv) a set of dummy variables which control for whether a country is a net oil importer or not (i.e. OilImpF
and OilImpC).
In what concerns the characteristics of housing boom episodes, the results suggest the existence of positive
duration dependence, as p is statistically greater than 1. Moreover, the second derivative of the baseline
hazard function (h0(t) = ptp 1) indicates the presence of constant positive duration dependence (i.e. p is
statistically equal to 2), which means that the probability of a housing boom ending at time t, given that it
lasted until that period, increases over time but at a constant rate (Castro, 2010). Moreover, the empirical
ndings show that booms have become longer over time, as the coe¢ cient of Event is negative, implying
that the likelihood of a boom ending fell over time. There is also some weak evidence that the longer the
previous phase is (no matter what, as the coe¢ cient of Prev is not statistically signicant), the smaller the
likelihood of a housing boom ending tends to be.
Regarding the inuence of the other time-invariant controls, we nd that no signicant di¤erences in the
duration of housing booms between European and non-European countries (i.e. European is not statistically
signicant). Most importantly for the scope of this paper, we do not uncover a di¤erent duration of this
phase of the housing market cycle between net oil importers and exporters, as the variables OilImpF and
OilImpC are not signicant. This implies that housing booms tend to be similar for net oil importers and
exporters. However, this is only a preliminary result. Indeed, some further analysis requires one to account
for other oil-related variables that are time-varying (e.g. oil prices).
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
This is done in Table 2, which reports the results associated with the estimation of the discrete-time
Cloglog model. To begin with, we consider the following specication for the logarithm of the baseline
hazard function in the discrete-time cloglog model: t = + (p  1) ln t, where t measures the duration of a
housing boom, i.e., t = Dur. The results corroborate the nding of the continuous-time model regarding
the duration dependence: the likelihood of a housing boom ending increases over time at a constant (or even
increasing) rate.
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Regarding the relevance of time-invariant controls, we get some evidence pointing to a longer duration of
housing booms in the group of European countries. As in the case of the continuous-time duration model,
no signicant di¤erence is found between net oil importers and net oil exporters. Similarly, the coe¢ cient
associated with the variable that captures the countrys oil dependence (i.e. net oil exports (as percentage
of GDP), (NetExp)) is not statistically signicant.
However, looking at the time-varying oil-related variables, some interesting conclusions emerge. In par-
ticular, we emphasize that the price of oil signicantly a¤ects the duration of housing booms. That is, the
higher the oil price in a specic country (OilPr) is, the higher the likelihood of a housing boom ending is.
More specically, when the oil price increases by one US dollar per barrel, the hazard rate (or the odds) of
a housing boom ending rises by a factor of, approximately, e0:042 = 1:043, that is, by close to 4:3%, ceteris
paribus. The same applies when we consider the world oil price (WOilPr): the coe¢ cient associated with
this variable is positive, which implies that a rise in the world price of oil increases the probability of ending
a housing boom.11 Thus, the duration of housing booms is signicantly shortened by increases in the world
price because they raise construction costs, reduce disposable income and hike ination expectations and the
probability of teetering into recession.
Putting these results into perspective, they suggest that increases in oil prices are counter-cyclical and
can act as an automatic stabilizer of the economy vis-à-vis periods of large and prolonged appreciation in real
housing prices. This is true for the oil-importing countries. From a more managerial and practitioner point
of view, investors should re-balance their portfolios by adopting short positions in real estate when faced with
oil price hikes during housing booms. Therefore, the liquidity of the real estate market in the oil-importing
countries should matter for investors. Concerning the net-oil exporting countries, strong increases in oil
prices raise all the boats including houses. Thus, oil prices are cyclical for these countries. All in all, both
oil-exporting and importing countries have oil risk exposures but at di¤erent sides of the business cycle.
Turning to the role played by the other macroeconomic factors (Xmacro), we show that: (i) when the
growth rate of real GDP (GDP ) increases, the likelihood of a housing boom ending falls even though the
e¤ect is not signicant; (ii) housing booms tend to be signicantly shorter when the interest rate (LendIR)
increases. In particular, a one percentage point rise in the interest rate boosts the hazard rate (or the odds) of
a housing boom ending by a factor of, approximately, e0:4 = 1:492, i.e., by about 50%, ceteris paribus;12 (iii)
the credit growth rate (Cred) does not inuence the duration of housing booms. Consequently, measures
aimed at controlling credit supply are likely to be ine¤ective in inuencing housing prices.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Finally, Table 3 summarizes the ndings associated with the estimation of Cloglog regressions that are
performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions. Given that the Weibull model is restrictive
regarding the shape of the hazard function since it assumes that this function can only rise or decline in
11This result is possibly more relevant for the oil-importing countries than for the oil-exporting countries where the housing
sector usually booms in an environment of rising oil prices. However, the lack of a reasonably large number of usable data
points invalidates any statistical inference based on sub-sample analysis.
12Note that the estimated coe¢ cients on this variable presented in Table 2 vary between 0:360 and 0:426, implying a change
in the hazard rate of between 43:3% and 53:1%.
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a monotonic way, we consider other more exible specications. More specically, we use natural cubic
splines (i.e. cubic polynomials of t (or Dur)) to smooth the coe¢ cients of the hazard function based
on them. The results with three cubic splines (i.e., Spline1, Spline2 and Spline3, each of them referring
to the linear, quadratic and cubic term, respectively) show that the coe¢ cients of the covariates remain
signicant and have the expected signs. Moreover, the coe¢ cients of the three cubic splines are also highly
signicant.13 Thus, the likelihood of a housing boom ending appears to behave in a nonlinear way and the
Cloglog specication represents the best framework to study the duration of housing booms and the one that
provides the most accurate characterization of the likelihood that they end after a certain duration.
In line with the previous duration models, we nd that: (i) an increase in oil prices raises the probability
of a housing boom ending; (ii) higher lending rates signicantly reduce the length of housing booms; and
(iii) neither the growth rate of real GDP, nor the growth rate of domestic credit to the private sector exert
a signicant impact on the duration of housing booms.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
4.2 From the oil sector to housing busts?
The empirical evidence regarding housing busts is reported in Tables 4-6. Once again, we start by
considering the basic continuous-time Weibull model (Table 4). The results point to the presence of constant
positive duration dependence, as p is statistically greater than 1 and statistically equal to 2, which means
that the probability of a housing bust ending at time t, given that it lasted until that period, increases over
time at a constant rate. There is some evidence that the longer the previous phase is (no matter what, as
the coe¢ cient associated with Prev is not statistically signicant), the smaller the likelihood of a housing
bust ending tends to be.
Regarding the inuence of time-invariant controls, our results do no point to signicant di¤erences in
the duration of housing busts between European and non-European countries. As for DurPrev, despite
its negative coe¢ cient suggesting that longer booms or normal time periods are followed by longer housing
busts, it is not statistically signicant. Interestingly, we nd that the fact that a country is a net oil importer
(OilImpF and OilImpC) is associated with an increase of the duration of housing busts. More specically,
this phase of the housing market cycle tends to be longer in net oil importing countries. In fact, the
coe¢ cients associated with these dummy variables are negative and statistically signicant. Therefore, net
oil importers typically face longer housing bust spells than net oil exporting countries. In economic terms,
the coe¢ cients associated with OilImpF and OilImpC range between  1:625 and  1:443, which implies
that being an oil importer reduces the likelihood of the end of a housing bust by between 76:4% and 80:3%.
The net oil-importing countries tend to have a larger and more diversied economy. They also have
higher decit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios which impair the operation of the scal policy and slow
down adjustments during slump periods. On the other hand, the net oil-exporting countries are usually
less diversied and commodity-based but they have less debt and large foreign reserves and sovereign wealth
13The three spline-basis variables correspond to knots at terms 1, 30, 45 and 68, respectively. This set of knots is chosen
because it produces statistically signicant variables and the lowest p-values in terms of the rejection of the null hypothesis in
likelihood ratio tests applied to the three cubic splines. A 3 - knot solution is also tried (two cubic splines), but the AIC, SBIC
and LRI are lower. Hence, the model with three cubic splines is the preferred one. These results are available upon request.
11
funds which they can use to re-jump their economies quicker than net oil-importing countries. In sum, during
slump periods, the exposure of the net oil-exporting countries to oil price risk is more manageable than for
the net oil-importing countries.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
When time-varying covariates are included in the discrete-time Cloglog model (Table 5), we observe that
the (constant) positive duration dependence still characterizes housing busts.
Moreover, the results from this discrete-time duration model are in line with its continuous-time coun-
terpart regarding the European dummy variable and, most importantly, they conrm that net oil importers
face longer housing bust spells than net oil exporters. Other oil-related variables, such as net oil exports (as
percentage of GDP) (NetExp) and oil prices (OilPr and WOilPr) do not seem to signicantly a¤ect the
duration of housing busts.
In line with our expectations, the results indicate that housing busts are mainly inuenced by the economic
environment or economic activity. That is, when the growth rate of real GDP (GDP ) increases, the likelihood
of a housing bust ending rises. A quantitative assessment reveals that the point coe¢ cient estimates associated
with GDP lie between 0:305 and 0:360, thereby implying that the duration of housing busts is reduced by
between 33:2% and 44:6% when the growth rate of real GDP raises by one percentage point. The coe¢ cient
of Cred is not signicant, but LendIR has a positive impact on the likelihood of a housing bust ending.
In light of the relevance of GDP growth as a driver of the duration of housing slumps, this nding suggests
that authorities in oil-importing countries may need to put in place more expansionary policies (such as,
large (scal) stimuli packages) to be able to deliver an e¤ective recovery of the housing sector compared to
oil-exporting economies (as in the case of many emerging markets).
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
Finally, Table 6 provides a summary of the estimation of Cloglog regressions that are performed using
natural cubic splines of the hazard functions. Again, we nd that the three cubic splines (Spline1, Spline2
and Spline3) are statistically signicant, thereby suggesting that the likelihood of a housing bust ending
displays some nonlinearity. In addition, we conrm that: (i) the longer exposure of net oil importers to
protracted housing busts vis-à-vis other countries; and (ii) the crucial role of improvements in real economic
activity as a way to shorten housing busts;
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
4.3 What do oil prices mean for normal times in the housing cycle?
We now turn to the duration analysis of normal times in the housing market cycle (Tables 7-9). In
Table 7, it can be seen that the likelihood of normal times ending depends on the length of this phase of the
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cycle. Moreover, the coe¢ cient p is statistically greater 1, but statistically lower than 2, which means that
the probability of normal times ending at time t, given that they have lasted until that period, increases
over time at a decreasing rate.
The results also indicate that the duration of normal times: (i) has not increased over time (the coe¢ cient
associated with Event is not signicant); and (ii) is independent of whether the previous event was a boom
or a bust (as reected in the lack of statistical signicance of Prev). Yet, there is some weak evidence
suggesting that the longer those spells are, the longer normal times will be (in accordance with the negative
coe¢ cient associated with DurPrev). Moreover, normal time spells in the housing market are, on average
shorter in the European than in the non-European countries. This indicates that the European countries
may move more quickly from a normal period to a housing boom than the non-European countries.
The empirical evidence also shows that the duration of normal times in the housing market is not
signicantly di¤erent between the net oil importers and the net oil exporters.
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE]
This is conrmed by the discrete-time model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model
(Table 8). Similarly, net oil exports (as percentage of GDP) (NetExp) - i.e., a measure of the oil dependence
of a country - does not signicantly impact the duration of normal time spells. However, the price of oil
has a signicantly negative e¤ect on the likelihood of normal timesending. Thus, in general, a rise in the
price of oil tends to be associated with longer normal time spells before they, eventually, turn into housing
booms. This result can be explained by the fact that increases in oil prices generally reect an improvement
of real economic activity, therefore, being associated with stronger fundamentals. Consequently, oil price
uctuations can be used as informative signals for investors when considering their asset portfolio allocations.
More specically, oil price increases (decreases) should be exploited by means of larger (smaller) exposure
to equities to the extent that they reect expectations of stronger (weaker) economic fundamentals.
This interpretation is corroborated by the empirical evidence concerning the set of macroeconomic de-
terminants. In fact, we nd that normal times in the housing market are mainly a¤ected by the economic
environment or economic activity, that is, these spells are shorter when GDP growth accelerates. Put it
di¤erently, when economic conditions improve, the housing market might enter a boom state and, as long as
the GDP growth keeps rising, the housing sector dynamics will remain in this phase over longer time spells.
In quantitative terms, a one percentage point rise in the growth rate of real GDP leads to an increase in the
likelihood of the end of a normal time spell by around 36:2%  46:2%.
The empirical ndings also reveal that a higher lending interest rate impinges negatively on the duration
of normal times by shortening it and, possibly, bringing the market to a housing bust. Thus, a one percentage
point increase in the lending interest rate raises the probability of normal times ending by about 10%.
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE]
Finally, in Table 9 we can see that the Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic splines
of the hazard functions for normal times conrm the previous results. Thus: (i) increases in oil prices are
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associated with a longer duration of normal times in the housing market, as they typically reect increases
in the demand for oil; (ii) an improvement in real economic activity can shorten normal time spells (by
promoting the transition to a housing boom); (iii) a tightening of money market conditions reduces the
length of normal times (by increasing the likelihood of a housing bust); and (iv) normal time spells are
on average shorter in the European countries than in the non-European countries. All three cubic splines
of the hazard function are also found to be statistically signicant, which gives rise to the importance of
nonlinearity in the likelihood of normal times ending.
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE. ]
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Using quarterly data for 20 European and non-European countries, net oil exporting and importing
industrialized countries, we assess the spillovers from the energy price uctuations to the various phases of
the housing market cycle (i.e., housing booms, housing busts and normal times), using various continuous-
and discrete-time duration models. We nd that housing booms tend to be shorter for both oil importers
and exporters when oil prices increase, reecting probably a demand or a supply oil shock. With regard
to the housing busts, the empirical evidence corroborates the idea that the net oil exporters appear to be
more immune to prolonged housing busts than the net oil importers, possibly due to greater foreign reserves
and more active scal policy. In what concerns normal times in the housing market, we show that oil price
increases typically reect an improvement in economic conditions. As a result, a rise in oil prices tends to
shorten normal time spells, possibly, by promoting the entry to a housing boom phase. Additionally, we
do not uncover a statistically signicant di¤erence in the average duration of housing booms and normal
times in the housing market between the net oil importers and the net oil exporters. Similarly, the degree
of exposure to commodity price uctuations - which can be captured by net oil exports (as a percentage of
GDP) - does not seem to a¤ect the housing market cycle in a signicant manner.
Turning to other major determinants of the housing market cycle, we conrm that economic growth
reduces the length of housing busts, while lending rates hikes are associated with shorter housing booms.(see,
for instance, Agnello et al. (forthcoming)). Hence, by helping to stimulate household income, cyclical policies
(for instance, monetary policy expansions or scal policies specically targeting the housing market like
reductions of capital gains taxes on houses, taxes on home purchases, housing gains or the imputed rental
value of the house and more tax deductibility of interest payments (Afonso and Sousa, 2011; Agnello et al.,
2012)) can promote the recovery of the housing sector or dampen its imbalances.
All in all, our study suggests that measures, such as a better risk management via hedging against
undesirable uctuations in the price of oil, help to prolong the duration of normal time spells in the housing
markets and may contribute to a sounder and more sustainable growth path. Similarly, by reducing a
countrys oil dependence, (public) investments in renewable energies can be a particularly e¤ective strategy
in oil importers as they will shorten the length of housing busts, thus avoiding the nancial instability
associated with boom-bust cycles.
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Due to the importance that money market conditions have on the duration of housing booms, our paper
also highlights the inuential role of monetary policy, specically by illustrating the impact of lending rates
on this phase of the housing market cycle. Hammoudeh et al. (2015) show that monetary contractions can
lead to a persistent reduction in the prices of energy. This last result has an important implication for the
current paper: by generating a prolonged fall in oil prices, monetary policy can also be crucial at preventing
housing booms in a quasi-permanent manner, thus emerging as a counter-force to the important e¤ects of
the oil factor on the housing market cycle.
Finally, in a related work, Jawadi et al. (2016) highlight that policy coordination between central banks
and government (in particular, in emerging markets) can be especially e¤ective in terms of boosting recoveries
from economic downturns. In light of the role played by economic growth at reducing the length of housing
busts, such coordination between monetary and scal policies can prove particularly powerful at eliminating
periods of protracted housing slumps, thus, maximizing the benets of stabilization policies.
Apart from providing valuable information about the impact of oil price uctuations on the length
of boom-bust housing cycles, the current article also opens new research avenues for further work. For
instance, Caporale and Sousa (2016) uncover heterogeneity in the treatment of nancial and housing assets
as complements or substitutes by investors in emerging markets. They show that this feature is explained
by di¤erences in the degree of equity market development and the level of income. Sousa et al. (2016)
also nd that, despite the reasonably good performance of the output gap to GDP ratio as a predictor,
many domestic macroeconomic variables (such as ination and interest rates) and macro-nance variables
(such as the consumption-wealth ratio), as well as their international counterparts, are poor predictors of
future equity returns in emerging markets. Thus, a promising direction that should be explored includes
the assessment of the role played by such factors at explaining housing market cycles in emerging market
economies. We leave this for future research.
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Appendix
A List of Tables
Table 1: Continuous-time (Weibull) model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p 2:007+;c 2:084+;c 2:008+;c 2:083+;c
(0:144) (0:165) (0:145) (0:165)
Event  0:596  0:591
(0:204) (0:203)
Prev  0:028  0:029
(0:361) (0:360)
DurPrev  0:008  0:008
(0:008) (0:008)
European  0:293 0:003  0:297  0:006
(0:357) (0:525) (0:354) (0:517)
OilImpF  0:049 0:079
(0:324) (0:329)
OilImpC  0:099 0:006
(0:432) (0:414)
Constant  6:625  5:465  6:587  5:412
(0:566) (0:698) (0:581) (0:702)
LogL  36:75  33:2  36:73  33:2
AIC 81:50 80:3 81:45 80:4
SBIC 88:64 92:7 88:59 92:7
LRI        
Observ: 44 43 44 43
Ended        
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
booms. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(4) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 2: Discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model for housing
booms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p 2:348+;c 2:382+;c 2:384+;c 2:828+;i 2:815+;i
(0:487) (0:485) (0:483) (0:412) (0:396)
GDP  0:098 -0:107  0:110  0:116  0:135
(0:102) (0:096) (0:098) (0:154) (0:127)
Cred 0:009 0:009 0:009 0:002 0:013
(0:011) (0:011) (0:010) (0:023) (0:014)
LendIR 0:360 0:367 0:366 0:426 0:414
(0:086) (0:087) (0:087) (0:090) (0:086)
European  0:490  0:498  0:487  0:682  0:671
(0:390) (0:396) (0:401) (0:333) (0:350)
NetExp  0:017
(0:049)
OilImpF 0:045
(0:442)
OilImpC 0:123
(0:420)
OilPr 0:042
(0:008)
WOilPr 0:037
(0:007)
Constant  13:004  13:182  13:251 13:430 13:092
(2:285) (2:251) (2:249) (2:222) (2:149)
LogL  134:3  136:5  136:4  112:0  128:8
AIC 282:5 287:0 286:9 238:0 271:6
SBIC 317:2 321:8 321:7 272:3 306:4
LRI 0:193 0:200 0:200 0:260 0:245
Observ: 1040 1069 1069 991 1069
Ended 39 40 40 35 40
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
booms. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue
to the continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 3: Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions for
housing booms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spline1 0:209 0:213 0:213 0:216 0:218
(0:037) (0:036) (0:036) (0:044) (0:039)
Spline2  0:251  0:259  0:258  0:322  0:343
(0:088) (0:084) (0:084) (0:104) (0:093)
Spline3 1:085 1:125 1:117 1:381 1:509
(0:486) (0:464) (0:464) (0:532) (0:487)
GDP  0:097  0:106  0:109  0:109  0:122
(0:104) (0:097) (0:099) (0:154) (0:129)
Cred 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:002 0:012
(0:012) (0:011) (0:011) (0:019) (0:012)
LendIR 0:362 0:369 0:368 0:425 0:408
(0:092) (0:093) (0:093) (0:091) (0:089)
European  0:527  0:535  0:522  0:495  0:493
(0:390) (0:389) (0:396) (0:407) (0:416)
NetExp  0:015
(0:043)
OilImpF 0:021
(0:412)
OilImpC 0:114
(0:390)
OilPr 0:045
(0:009)
WOilPr 0:042
(0:009)
Constant  9:779  9:903  9:982  11:851  11:539
(1:490) (1:503) (1:506) (1:694) (1:629)
LogL  134:7  136:9  136:8  112:3  128:8
AIC 287:3 291:8 291:7 242:5 275:6
SBIC 331:9 336:5 336:4 286:6 320:4
LRI 0:190 0:198 0:198 0:259 0:245
Observ: 1040 1069 1069 991 1069
Ended 39 40 40 35 40
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
booms. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) report the Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic
splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 30, 45 and 68.
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Table 4: Continuous-time (Weibull) model for housing busts.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p 2:267+;c 2:935+;i 2:239+;c 2:881+;c
(0:273) (0:480) (0:253) (0:545)
Event  0:687  0:566
(0:624) (0:653)
Prev 0:827 0:896
(0:485) (0:488)
DurPrev  0:035  0:041
(0:036) (0:031)
European 1:501 1:441 1:528 1:375
(1:093) (0:995) (1:079) (0:920)
OilImpF  1:443  1:452
(0:340) (0:615)
OilImpC  1:543  1:625
(0:435) (0:507)
Constant  7:738  8:577  7:522  8:376
(1:705) (2:272) (1:684) (2:432)
LogL  19:47  15:0  19:63  15:0
AIC 46:94 44:1 47:25 44:0
SBIC 52:12 53:1 52:43 53:1
LRI        
Observ: 27 27 27 27
Ended        
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
busts. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual delays
in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(4) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 5: Discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model for housing
busts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p 2:210+;c 2:411+;c 2:462+;c 2:508+;c 2:577+;c
(0:357) (0:341) (0:321) (0:619) 0:566
GDP 0:360 0:305 0:287 0:357 0:354
(0:190) (0:167) (0:155) (0:187) (0:183)
Cred  0:088  0:044  0:041  0:074  0:066
(0:072) (0:081) (0:086) (0:072) (0:072)
LendIR 0:118 0:100 0:117 0:117 0:118
(0:059) (0:063) (0:054) (0:062) (0:060)
European 1:146 1:259 1:167 1:055 1:191
(1:277) (1:299) (1:328) (1:168) (1:119)
NetExp  0:002
(0:028)
OilImpF  0:965
(0:395)
OilImpC  1:259
(0:595)
OilPr  0:018
(0:016)
WOilPr  0:020
(0:015)
Constant  9:011  8:718  8:668  9:263  9:504
(1:698) (1:907) (1:903) (0:016) (2:075)
LogL  67:9  70:4  69:6  67:0  70:5
AIC 149:9 154:8 153:9 148:0 155:0
SBIC 179:9 185:2 184:2 177:8 185:4
LRI 0:141 0:153 0:159 0:144 0:152
Observ: 544 565 565 521 565
Ended 18 19 19 18 19
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
busts. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual delays
in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the
continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 6: Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions for
housing busts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spline1 0:213 0:247 0:251 0:218 0:228
(0:069) (0:067) (0:066) (0:069) (0:064)
Spline2  0:594  0:666  0:673  0:595  0:638
(0:234) (0:228) (0:228) (0:219) (0:211)
Spline3 2:163 2:376 2:407 2:126 2:322
(0:990) (0:966) (0:973) (0:956) (0:925)
GDP 0:359 0:297 0:289 0:369 0:364
(0:185) (0:159) (0:147) (0:182) (0:178)
Cred  0:093  0:050  0:053  0:088  0:080
(0:064) (0:074) (0:074) (0:069) (0:070)
LendIR 0:114 0:096 0:111 0:115 0:114
(0:055) (0:059) (0:049) (0:056) (0:055)
European 0:897 0:873 0:823 0:809 0:917
(0:961) (0:936) (0:954) (0:971) (0:946)
NetExp  0:007
(0:028)
OilImpF  1:092
(0:413)
OilImpC  1:367
(0:637)
OilPr 0:000
(0:012)
WOilPr 0:002
(0:013)
Constant  8:385  7:846  7:714  8:463  8:706
(1:612) (1:842) (1:876) (1:741) (1:630)
LogL  66:0  67:9  67:4  65:8  69:2
AIC 150:0 153:7 152:8 149:6 156:4
SBIC 188:7 192:8 191:8 187:7 195:5
LRI 0:165 0:184 0:189 0:159 0:167
Observ: 544 565 565 521 565
Ended 18 19 19 18 19
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
busts. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) report the Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic
splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 30, 45 and 85.
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Table 7: Continuous-time (Weibull) model for normal times.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p 1:316+;d 1:576+;d 1:317+;d 1:559+;d
(0:144) (0:190) (0:144) (0:199)
Event  0:161  0:114
(0:283) (0:265)
Prev  0:318  0:345
(0:478) (0:483)
DurPrev  0:031  0:033
(0:019) (0:019)
European 0:795 1:114 0:791 1:012
(0:383) (0:462) (0:387) (0:441)
OilImpF 0:029  0:369
(0:298) (0:362)
OilImpC 0:069  0:034
(0:343) (0:426)
Constant  4:864  4:066  4:895  4:274
(0:517) (0:970) (0:553) (1:044)
LogL  55:21  43:0  55:20  43:2
AIC 118:42 100:0 118:39 100:5
SBIC 125:73 112:1 125:71 112:6
LRI        
Observ: 46 42 46 42
Ended        
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of normal
time spells. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(4) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 8: Discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model for normal
times.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p 1:290+;d 1:295+;d 1:299+;d 1:337+;d 1:290+;d
(0:152) (0:143) (0:144) (0:151) (0:137)
GDP 0:380 0:337 0:341 0:309 0:335
(0:130) (0:104) (0:081) (0:099) (0:092)
Cred 0:007 0:009 0:008 0:009 0:009
(0:016) (0:013) (0:014) (0:013) (0:013)
LendIR 0:102 0:088 0:087 0:045 0:037
(0:034) (0:033) (0:034) (0:037) (0:038)
European 1:222 1:097 1:103 1:235 1:175
(0:463) (0:404) (0:400) (0:422) (0:404)
NetExp  0:024
(0:040)
OilImpF  0:201
(0:293)
OilImpC  0:180
(0:301)
OilPr  0:015
(0:009)
WOilPr  0:020
(0:009)
Constant  5:750  5:360  5:391  4:780  4:335
(0:799) (0:686) (0:667) (0:807) (0:831)
LogL  111:2  116:0  116:0  108:3  113:5
AIC 236:5 246:0 246:0 230:5 241:1
SBIC 268:0 277:5 277:5 261:9 272:6
LRI 0:081 0:073 0:073 0:087 0:093
Observ: 639 663 663 653 663
Ended 30 31 31 29 31
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of normal
time spells. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue
to the continuous-time Weibull model.
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Table 9: Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions for normal
times.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spline1 0:054 0:061 0:064 0:066 0:058
(0:031) (0:030) (0:033) (0:031) (0:029)
Spline2  0:302  0:334  0:353  0:323  0:299
(0:196) (0:187) (0:199) (0:191) (0:187)
Spline3 1:176 1:293 1:361 1:186 1:107
(0:753) (0:717) (0:759) (0:736) (0:729)
GDP 0:355 0:330 0:335 0:307 0:331
(0:136) (0:110) (0:110) (0:101) (0:092)
Cred 0:003 0:005 0:004 0:005 0:005
(0:016) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:013)
LendIR 0:122 0:112 0:112 0:059 0:051
(0:039) (0:039) (0:038) (0:046) (0:047)
European 1:114 1:076 1:080 1:102 1:025
(0:424) (0:363) (0:376) (0:375) (0:366)
NetExp 0:008
(0:042)
OilImpF  0:432
(0:248)
OilImpC  0:453
(0:346)
OilPr  0:015
(0:008)
WOilPr  0:020
(0:009)
Constant  5:619  5:246  5:272  4:642  4:189
(0:679) (0:609) (0:626) (0:837) (0:878)
LogL  110:5  114:9  114:8  107:4  112:7
AIC 238:9 247:8 247:7 232:8 243:5
SBIC 279:1 288:3 288:2 273:1 284:0
LRI 0:088 0:082 0:083 0:095 0:100
Observ: 639 663 663 653 663
Ended 30 31 31 29 31
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of normal
time spells. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(5) report the Cloglog regressions that are performed using natural cubic
splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 35, 60 and 107.
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Figure 2. Non-parametric estimates for the hazard rates and survival functions.
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